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Abstract: This paper addresses inferences to the explanandum: inferences from the premise 
that an explanandum is plausibly explained to the conclusion that this explanandum (or a claim 
or representation thereof) is adequate or true. These inferences consist in answering why or 
how something occurs to concluding that it occurs. Psychological research and scientific cases 
reveal that inferences to the explanandum are proposed by lay people and scientists, and some 
philosophical accounts permit these inferences. This is problematic, as pseudoscientific claims 
are often believed (or at least espoused) because they are plausibly explained. We should be 
skeptical of inferences to the explanandum. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Philosophical accounts of explanation identify the targets to be explained 
(explananda) and the explanations for them (explanantia). There is also analysis of 
explanatory reasoning, which includes but is not limited to analyses of inferences to the best 
explanation. However, what is less discussed is the defensibility of an inference in the other 
direction: should we infer to an explanandum from plausibly explaining it? 
While this inference is seldom discussed by philosophers, it is no less pressing. 
Consider that individuals’ judgments of explananda are influenced by the explanations that 
are provided for them. A prima facie example of this is the “soy boy” effect. In this case, the 
explanandum is that soy consumption has “feminizing effects on men” (Messina 2010, 
2095). Adherents claim that they believe in this effect in part because they can “explain” it: 
soy contains phytoestrogens, the ingestion of which causes changes in sex characteristics. 
This claim has the proper form for one account of explanation: it sketches a mechanistic 
relation between soy consumption and bodily changes. It also has some degree of empirical 
support: evidence corroborates that soy contains chemicals called ‘phytoestrogens’ and that 
hormonal estrogen can induce these changes in humans. However, there is no evidence that 
soy has this effect in humans (Messina 2010). This case of explaining to support an 
explanandum’s belief-worthiness, whether involving a good faith inference or not, seems to 
have considerable rhetorical power. This raises a question. When provided a plausible 
explanation, should we infer that its explanandum is adequate or true? Should we (say) 
believe that the soy boy effect occurs based on its explanation? 
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 This paper casts doubt on the idea that it is acceptable to infer that an explanandum is 
adequate or true from the provision of a plausible explanation for it – what I call an inference 
to the explanandum. The provision of an explanation serves as such a bad reason to infer that 
its explanandum is true or adequate that, when explaining stands as the sole basis for 
inferences regarding its explanandum, one should infer that this explanandum is explainable 
but should not infer that is true or adequate. My doubt is not based on deficiencies of so-
called “plausible explanations”; I remain skeptical even when explanations match the form of 
mechanistic models (Craver 2007) and have empirical support.  
 In Section 2, I introduce inferences to the explanandum and define ‘plausible 
explanation.’ In Section 3, I discuss different conclusions that may be inferred about an 
explanandum from explaining it. In Section 4, I argue that we should be skeptical of 
inferences to the explanandum. This is because (1) explanantia do not provide evidential 
support for their explananda, (2) the evidence for explanantia need not transfer to 
explananda, and (3) the idea that “bona fide” explaining entails that explananda are adequate 
or true does not warrant inferring to the explanandum. Inferences that conclude with the 
explainability of explananda are, by contrast, acceptable. I conclude by discussing how 
inferences to the explanandum illustrate a drawback of lay, scientific, and philosophical 
predilections for explanation: unsupported claims or outright pseudoscience can garner 
legitimacy from epistemically suspect inferences and subsequently can be exploited for 
unscrupulous aims. 
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2. Inference to the Explanandum 
 An inference to the explanandum consists in inferring from the premise that a given 
explanandum is plausibly explained to the conclusion that this explanandum (or a claim or 
representation thereof) is adequate or true. This amounts to concluding that an explanandum 
is belief worthy (or a cognate epistemic attitude) from explaining it.1 A plausible explanation 
consists in a claim or representation that has the form for a philosophical account of scientific 
explanation as well as some degree of empirical support for its content. For example, if I 
infer from the premise that I can plausibly explain why the soy boy effect occurs to the 
conclusion that it occurs, I infer to the explanandum. This inference juxtaposes an inference 
to the best explanation, or an inference “from the premise that a given hypothesis would 
provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the 
conclusion that the given hypothesis is true” (Harman 1965, 89).  
Let me detail my characterization. First, inferences to the explanandum are inferences 
about the adequacy or truth of the explanandum: they are not inferences concluding 
something else about an explanandum, such as it being predictive or explainable. Second, 
inferences to the explanandum are inferences about specific explananda: if the explanandum 
 
1 I include “a claim or representation” to reflect that ontic accounts of explanation take 
explananda to be in the world and therefore not candidates for being true or adequate (Halina 
2017). I include “adequate” to accommodate accounts of explanation that do not construe 
explananda as candidates for being true.  
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is the soy boy effect, for example, it is an inference about this effect as it is characterized by 
its adherents. It is not a broader, unspecific inference about there being some explanandum 
that is explained. Third, unlike inferences to the best explanation, inferences to the 
explanandum are not about picking the best explanandum from a set of explananda. Rather, it 
is an inference about the particular explanandum and no other.  
Motivation for this paper comes from research on explanation effects. This effect is 
exemplified by Ross and colleagues, who tested whether or not “the process of explaining an 
event increases its subjective likelihood for the perceiver” in subjects who were told that the 
events were fictious (1977, 818), from which they conclude “that providing an explanation 
for an event substantially increases the subjective likelihood of the occurrence of the event” 
(1977, 825-826). Explanation effects are discussed by Lombrozo, who notes that 
“psychological findings suggest that the mere existence of an explanation can influence the 
probability assigned to an explanandum,” and “explaining a hypothetical outcome… 
increases the subjective probability of that outcome” (2011, 545). Some psychologists 
present concerns about “this reliance on explanatory considerations” in reasoning (Lombrozo 
2011, 546). For instance, Kuhn notes that “people… depend on explanations that allow their 
claims to ‘make sense’,” but she emphasizes that explanations “lead to overconfidence, they 
inhibit examination of alternatives, and, most seriously, they may be false” (2001, 1).  
 What do inferences to the explanandum have to do with science? First, some accounts 
of explanatory reasoning permit these inferences. For example, Thagard’s explanatory 
coherence account, according to which “we should accept propositions that cohere with our 
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other beliefs” (1989, 436), indicates that “a hypothesis coheres with what it explains,” and 
“we should accept or reject propositions based on their overall coherence with one another” 
(2006, 142). Explanatory coherence accounts “for a wide range of explanatory inferences,” 
including, it would appear, inferences to the explanandum (Thagard 1989, 435). Inferences to 
the explanandum are also indirectly supported by Hempel’s conception of “explanatory 
relevance”: explanatory information “affords good grounds for believing that the 
phenomenon to be explained did, or does, indeed occur” (1966, 48). While Hempel accounts 
for explanation rather than reasoning, explanatory relevance supports the idea that, in 
general, an explanation’s quality should be measured in terms of the support it lends to 
believing in its explanandum. This idea provides some justification for inferring to the 
explanandum.  
Second, scientists’ judgments of explananda are influenced by explaining them. 
Scientists, on occasion, take mechanisms to “add weight” to what these mechanisms explain: 
“an analogy would be that we are more certain that we actually went to the moon if we 
understand the small scale step-by-step mechanisms that explain how we got there” (Patihis 
2018, 375). Psychologists provide reason to worry that inferences like this are not 
uncommon. When studying explanatory reasoning in science students, Masnick and 
Zimmerman claim that because “individuals are more likely to believe an empirical finding if 
there is a theory or explanation for that finding, … it is unsurprising that the presence of 
explanatory information would increase perceptions of how important or interesting a topic 
is” (Masnick and Zimmerman 2009, 35). This tendency to infer to the explanandum seems 
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greatest with mechanistic explanations (Craver 2007), which is why I focus specifically on 
mechanistic explanation.2 
 
3. Inferences about Explananda 
Given the wealth of evidence that suggests that inferences to the explanandum occur 
amongst lay people, I focus on explanatory inferences amongst scientists. While these occur, 
not all inferences regarding explananda fit my characterization of an inference to the 
explanandum. Therefore, it is prudent to disentangle these inferences. I discuss two cases. 
Each case involves the provision of a plausible explanation. The first case is the plausible 
explanation of a controversial explanandum. The second case is the plausible explanation of 
a putatively unexplainable target.  
 
3.1. Plausibly Explaining a Controversial Explanandum 
What happens when researchers infer that a controversial target phenomenon occurs 
from its plausible mechanistic explanation? Memory transfer is one of the most notorious 
cases of a controversial phenomenon to have been alleged to occur in the history of science. 
This phenomenon was characterized as the transfer of memories from one organism to 
another via the transfer of tissue. A proponent of memory transfer, Ungar, defended that this 
 
2 Equivalent concerns can be devised for other accounts of scientific explanation, but this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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alleged phenomenon occurs because he could provide a plausible mechanistic explanation for 
memory transfer’s occurrence (Colaço 2018, 37). 
Ungar supported that he transferred memories via chemical injection by claiming that 
he had isolated its chemical substrate, which he called “scotophobin” (1974, 599). With this 
substrate isolated, Ungar schematized it as a component of a mechanism for memory 
transfer. He claims that it is “widely held, in spite of the inadequacy and controversial nature 
of the evidence, that some sort of molecular coding would be the most likely explanation of 
learning,” and he claims that “built-in pathways… can be founded, and a fully developed 
molecular coding system which maintains the synaptic connections between the neurons of 
each functionally related pathway” can be schematized (Ungar 1968, 222). Ungar claims that 
“this peptide, called scotophobin, was synthesized and distributed to a number of 
laboratories, which confirmed its dark-avoidance inducing effect,” which suggests that 
schematizing this mechanism and providing evidence for it is reason to believe in memory 
transfer (1974, 599, my emphasis). This is a plea to infer to the explanandum from this 
mechanistic model. 
Ungar’s contemporaries were skeptical about memory transfer. One skeptic, Stewart, 
claims that Ungar’s “conclusions are more likely false than true,” though he notes that the 
“synthesis of the pentadecapeptide [scotophobin] is essentially sound” (Stewart 1972, 209). 
Like other skeptics, Stewart appears to have accepted Ungar’s mechanistic model as 
plausible insofar as he accepted that components of the model were empirically supported. 
Nevertheless, Stewart and others claimed that Ungar provided insufficient evidence to 
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believe in the explanandum. It would appear that the “inadequacy and controversial nature of 
the evidence” was sufficient to keep skeptics skeptical of the alleged explanandum. The 
skeptics won out: the memory transfer project collapsed, despite Ungar plausibly explaining 
this explanandum (Colaço 2018, 37). 
 
3.2. Plausibly Explaining an “Unexplainable” Target 
What about cases in which an explanation is provided for a putatively unexplainable 
target? One alleged inference of this character is in the case of continental drift. Historians 
have argued that continental drift, or the movement of continents over time, was rejected by 
geologists in part because it was not explainable. It was not until the provision of an 
“adequate causal mechanism” in modern plate tectonics, this argument continues, that 
continental drift was accepted (Oreskes 1988, 312). Laudan claims that “the problem with 
drift was not that there was no known mechanism or cause, but that any conceivable 
mechanism would conflict with physical theory” (1978, 230).  
Oreskes challenges these historical claims. She claims that “a theory of drift did not 
fail for lack of a mechanism,” highlighting that researchers had provided explanations that 
were largely rejected (Oreskes 1988, 331). Oreskes argues that “the most likely cause of the 
rejection of continental drift was the evidence put forward to support it” (1988, 332), though 
some geologists rejected it due to the “lack of an adequate driving force for drift” (1988, 
334). This suggests that better evidence for continental drift was desired, though there were 
concerns about its explanation as well. That being said, Oreskes argues that the acceptance of 
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drift came from “not the elucidation of… the mechanism by which they occur, but by the 
availability of a new kind of evidence” (1988, 346).  
On either Laudan or Oreskes’ construal of the case, plausibly explaining continental 
drift resulted in researchers investigating it. However, three features differ the continental 
drift case from the scotophobin case. First, many researchers argued that continental drift was 
unexplainable, while skeptics accepted that memory transfer was explainable. Second, no 
researcher suggests that explaining drift “confirms” its occurrence, as Ungar argued. If 
something was inferred from the mechanistic models of plate tectonics, it was not the 
adequacy or truth of the explanandum. Third, even if an inference about the explanandum 
occurred in the drift case, this inference was wrapped into debates about what counts as 
evidence for the explanandum. Neither historical construal suggests that continental drift was 
believed solely based on its plausible explanation.  
 
4. Whither Inference to the Explanandum? 
The cases in Section 3 show that there are at least two distinct inferences one might 
make about an explanandum from its plausible explanation. The scotophobin case matches 
what I characterize as an inference to the explanandum. By contrast, the continental drift case 
has two differences: it does not involve inferring that the explanandum is adequate or true, 
and it involves inferences about targets that were previously considered to be unexplainable. 
It is these differences that make the latter sort of inference acceptable, while the former sort – 
inferences to the explanandum – are epistemically suspect. 
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Inferences to the explanandum, meaning the inference from a plausible explanation to 
the truth or adequacy of its explanandum, are inferences about which we should be skeptical. 
This is because these inferences, despite their apparently compelling character, do not 
empirically support the explanandum’s truth or adequacy. For one, explanantia are not 
evidence for explananda. Following on Kuhn’s insight (2001), explaining alone provides no 
evidence for the explanandum, even if this “explaining” matches the form of an account of 
explanation and coheres with the characterized explanandum as specified on the explanatory 
coherence account. The study from Ross and colleagues illustrates this limitation of 
explaining: one can plausibly explain explananda that are known to be fictitious without 
making these explananda any less fictitious. Thus, if one argues that an explanation warrants 
believing in its explanandum, it will not be through a plausible explanation serving as 
evidence for this explanandum.3  
Perhaps the empirical support for plausible explanations transfers to the 
explanandum. After all, part of what makes explanations plausible is that they have some 
degree of empirical support. This support, one might argue, is also support for the 
explanandum. The explanatory coherence account corroborates this idea. If the explanans 
 
3 Even the explanatory coherence account indicates that evidence is stronger than 
explanation: “a proposition describing the results of observation has a degree of acceptability 
on its own,” as “it can stand on its own more successfully than can a hypothesis whose sole 
justification is what it explains” (Thagard 1989, 437-438).   
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and explanandum cohere, and the explanans and its evidence cohere, then the explanandum 
and this evidence cohere. Therefore, on this account, evidence that coheres with an 
explanation also supports its coherent explanandum.  
However, evidence for a plausible explanation need not be transitive. Even when 
components of an explanation are empirically supported, this evidence may be neutral to the 
truth or adequacy of its explanandum. The evidence that supports the identification of 
scotophobin does not provide a test of the occurrence of the explanandum in this case: the 
peptide may underwrite a distinct explanandum phenomenon. The “soy boy” case also 
illustrates this lack of transitivity: neither the fact that phytoestrogen is in soy nor the fact that 
hormonal estrogen has this effect is evidence that phytoestrogens function like human 
hormonal estrogen. 
What about cases where the evidence does transfer from explanans to explanandum? 
This no more supports the acceptability of inferences to the explanandum than when 
evidence does not transfer. If the evidence for an explanans is transitive, then this evidence 
confirms the explanandum. The explanation merely serves as a means to connect the 
explanandum with this evidence. The idea of transitive evidence may go some way in 
explaining the putative successes of reasoning strategies like the explanatory coherence 
model: so long as there is evidence that supports the explanandum, this evidence, the 
explanandum, and its explanans cohere, and the explanandum is supported as a result. 
However, this is not an inference to the explanandum.  
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Perhaps the acceptability of inferences to the explanandum is independent of 
evidential considerations. One might have the intuition that something does not count as 
“bona fide” explaining if its explanandum is not true or adequate. This intuition supports the 
idea that the scotophobin case involves unacceptable inferences because of deficiencies of 
the so-called “explanation” rather than issues with inferences to the explanandum in general. 
This intuition hints at two ideas. First, plausible explanations fail to count as bona fide 
explaining, so my examples have no relevance to adjudicating the acceptability of inferences 
to the explanandum, and it is a mistake to refer to them in terms of ‘explanation,’ 
‘explanans,’ or ‘explanandum.’ Second, because the adequacy or truth of the explanandum is 
sin qua non for bona fide explaining, inferences to the explanandum that involve bona fide 
explanations are acceptable because of this relation. Thus, the reader may be sympathetic to 
the idea that, regardless of whether or not they are called ‘explanations,’ one cannot explain 
an explanandum that is false or inadequate. This intuition may lead the reader to be doubtful 
of the explanatory merit of what I call ‘plausible explanations.’ 
While this intuition may be compelling, we should dismiss it. For one, endorsing this 
intuition comes at the cost of descriptive adequacy. The majority of explanations in science 
likely are not “bona fide” in the relevant sense. Even if bona fide explaining entails that the 
explananda are true or adequate, this does not entail that these inferences are acceptable in 
real explanatory practices: even if we assume that only true or adequate explananda are 
genuinely explained, many times in practice, these explananda turn out to be false or 
inadequate. Explanatory claims made by scientists also should be taken seriously because, 
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whether one wants to count them as deficient or not, the explanations put forward in the 
scotophobin and soy boy cases match the form of the mechanistic account and have empirical 
support. This suggests that this intuition is at odds not only with how explanatory claims are 
employed in science but also with philosophical accounts of scientific explanation.  
However, there is a deeper issue with this intuition. Even if we accept that, in 
principle, bona fide explanations are explanations of true or adequate explananda, this alone 
does not warrant an inference to the explanandum. This is because it leaves open the question 
of how we come to know that an explanation is bona fide, and we thus are permitted to infer 
from it to the truth or adequacy of the explanandum. This epistemic issue speaks to why 
Craver suggests that characterizing “the [explanandum] phenomenon correctly and 
completely is a crucial step” in developing explanatory models (Craver 2007, 128). 
Mechanists like Craver take correct models of explanantia to depend on correct 
characterizations of explananda, and not the other way around. This emphasis on settling the 
explanandum before moving on to the explanans is typical in philosophical analysis of 
explanation: “the event or phenomenon in question is usually accepted as a matter of fact,” as 
“in an explanation the purpose of the explanans is to shed light on, or make sense of, the 
explanandum event – not to prove that it occurred” (Hurley 2014, 21). This casts doubt on 
the idea that one could identify bona fide explaining, let alone infer the adequacy of its 
explanandum from it, without first correctly characterizing the explanandum. If a correct 
characterization is required, then an inference to the explanandum is, at best, redundant. 
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Inferences to the explanandum are not justifiable on evidential grounds, and they are 
not justifiable on grounds of the relations between explanantia and explananda. Is this 
enough to rule them out as unacceptable? Perhaps these inferences are acceptable for a 
reason that I have failed to identify, but these deficiencies support my general skepticism 
about inferences to the explanandum. My conclusion is akin to the skepticism many 
philosophers have about inferences to the best explanation. Those concerned with inferences 
to the best explanation claim that there is an “expectation that one should establish the reality 
of one’s posits on non-explanatory grounds” when determining the belief-worthiness of these 
posits (Novick and Scholl 2020, 7). If one cannot establish these posits for reasons aside 
from explanatory power, one should be skeptical that they are belief worthy. This parallels 
my skepticism of inferences to the explanandum: without establishing one’s explanandum 
independently of explaining it, one should be skeptical of it. 
If the sort of inferences exemplified by the scotophobin case are ones about which we 
should be skeptical, what does this mean for the sort of inferences exemplified by the 
continental drift case? The answer is simple: these inferences are acceptable because one 
infers that the explanandum is explainable based on its plausible explanation. This is a 
straightforward inference from the premise that a target is plausibly explained to the 
conclusion that it can be explained. And, if one adopted an epistemic stance towards a target 
based on its perceived unexplainability, then one should change one’s epistemic stance 
towards that target once one infers that it is explainable.  
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Inferring that a target is explainable and inferring that it is true or adequate are not 
equivalent. As we saw in the scotophobin case, skeptics of memory transfer did not deny that 
the alleged explanandum was explainable. Nonetheless, they were skeptical of memory 
transfer, and they ultimately rejected it in light of deficient evidential support. In the 
continental drift case, part of the reason some geologists rejected drift prior the mid-20th 
century, Oreskes argues, was tied to them thinking that there was no possible explanation for 
it, in addition to their assessment of the quality of evidence put forward to support it. Thus, in 
this case, the explanandum was initially rejected (at least in part) because researchers at the 
time were skeptical about its explainability.  
If they are not inferred to be true or adequate, then how should we conceive of these 
targets that have been inferred to be explainable? If a claim about a target is not rejected, but 
researchers are not yet in a position to determine its truth or adequacy, then it is at least 
pursuit worthy in the sense that it is worth investigating “to the extent that it can be shown to 
have a promising potential for contributing… [to] scientific knowledge” (Šešelja and Straßer 
2014, 3115). Thus, researchers can investigate this explanandum with the aim of producing 
evidence for or against its truth or adequacy. They can, for example, generate predictions 
about this explanandum. This is not an inference to the explanandum. Rather, it supports the 
idea that evidence is needed to assess the truth or adequacy of an explanandum.  
While inferences about explainability may help orient us towards new investigations, 
there are examples of active targets of scientific investigation that have yet to be plausibly 
explained. For example, there is the placebo effect, which is accepted despite it lacking an 
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explanation (Price et al. 2008). This idea is not foreign to geology either. Oreskes notes that 
“many empirical scientific phenomena have been accepted before their causes were known,” 
highlighting that unexplained targets are not immediately rejected for being unexplained 
(1988, 324). The idea that one need not prove targets are explainable prior to investigating 
them should not be surprising, given the order in which things occur on the mechanistic 
account: it is critical to correctly characterize explananda phenomena in order to correctly 
model their mechanistic explanations. Of course, cases like the placebo effect lack an 
explanation at this time, but they are not considered to be unexplainable. I take no stand on 
the conditions under which something should be judged to be unexplainable. What matters is 
that, often in science, targets that were considered to be unexplainable are explained, and 
inferring from the premise that a target is plausibly explained to the conclusion that it is 
explainable is an acceptable inference. This is not an inference to the explanandum. 
 
5. Conclusion 
It is important for philosophers to acknowledge that explanations are compelling to a 
fault, and our predilection for explanation is not an unequivocally good thing. I have 
provided reason to be skeptical of the idea that the explanations that we find in science can 
serve as the basis for inferring that their explananda are adequate or true. My conclusions 
cast accounts of explanatory reasoning like the explanatory coherence account in question, 
given that it supports inferences to the explanandum. Further, I have shown that inferences to 
the explanandum ought to be distinguished from inferences about the explainability of 
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explananda, the latter of which are acceptable. Overall, I have shown that it is unwise to 
employ explanations for epistemic tasks for which they are ill suited. 
How do inferences to the explanandum fit into the philosophical discussion of 
explanation? The overarching reason to address these inferences is not that they are accepted 
by philosophers, even if this is the case. Rather, the reason is that they are proposed in both 
scientific and lay reasoning. This fact highlights a serious concern about the rhetorical 
strength of explanation claims in scientific as well as lay reasoning about science or 
pseudoscience, even when the inferences made from these claims are epistemically suspect 
and possibly put forward in bad faith. Whether knowingly or not, individuals can exploit our 
explanatory predilections to legitimize pseudoscience and achieve unscrupulous aims 
supported by the espousal of this pseudoscience, as appears to be the case with the alt-right 
espousal of “soy boys.” We must ask if the philosophy of science inadvertently contributes to 
this situation by focusing on explanation while eliding discussion of its limited epistemic 
implications. For this reason, and despite the rhetorical strength explaining has in science and 
everyday life, we should be skeptical about changing our epistemic stance towards what is 
being explained when an explanation is provided for it. Further, we should be suspicious 
about the provision of plausible explanations as the basis for inferences about the belief-
worthiness of controversial research targets in scientific and lay discourse, particularly in 
cases where evidence for these targets is deficient. 
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